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Sec. 80. The International Council, its committees and sections, and the International Court, shall have power to make requisition upon States of the League for information and to call upon them to secure the attendance of witnesses.

Sec. 81. The Council of Conciliation and the International Court shall have power to summon a State of the League to appear and answer any complaint which has been filed.

Sec. 82. The recommendation of the Council of Conciliation and the decision of the International Court shall be made within one year from the time of the submission of the question in dispute, unless, by stipulation of the parties, the time be extended.

Sec. 83. There shall be no costs, recording or other fees, levied against a litigant before the Council of Conciliation or before the International Court.

Sec. 84. The expenses of maintaining the International Council and the International Court shall be borne by the States of the League in proportion to their respective social incomes, as determined by the International Council.

ARTICLE V.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES.

Sec. 85. There shall be International Conferences constituted of representatives from the States which were invited to the Second Hague Conference, and the duties of the Conferences shall be to codify and develop international law.

Sec. 86. The International Council shall call and dissolve the Conferences.

Sec. 87. The basis of representation in the Conferences shall be units of population and commerce, and such other elements as the Conferences may determine.

Sec. 88. The acts of the Conferences shall be binding on each participant unless rejected by it within the period of one year after the adjournment of the Conference.

AMPLIFICATION OF THE COVENANT.

Note I. Subject to regulations made by the International Council, the Secretarial Bureau shall take charge of and be responsible for the funds belonging to or in the custody of the International Council, the collection of all receipts due to the Council, and the making of all authorized payments; further, the Secretarial Bureau shall take charge of and be responsible for all complaints and other papers, books and other documents, belonging to or in the custody of the International Council; transmit all requisitions for information, summons, subpoenas, injunctions, recommendations and all other necessary communications on behalf of the International Council to States or individuals; keep an accurate record of the proceedings of the International Council and publish the Official Journal, all recommendations and opinions, and such other documents as the International Council may from time to time direct; make record of all papers filed and issued; make translations of the record of the proceedings of the International Council or a synopsis thereof, recommendations, opinions and such other documents as the International

Council may direct, and communicate them to the States of the League.

Note II. All formal complaints shall be filed with the Secretarial Bureau.

A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON

THERE are projects that exist in shadowy form in an atmosphere of tepid idealism, admired by those who see that, if possible, they would be desirable. From time to time an attempt is made to embody them in material form and make them of practical use in national or international politics. It is then discovered that what appeared as an ideal to be wholly desirable and amiable cannot be of practical use, unless we are ready to subject ourselves to some limitations or discipline that may be inconvenient, and unless we are prepared to overcome some difficulties that were not at first sight apparent.

The ideal is found to have in fact a stern and disagreeable as well as an easy and amiable side to it. Thereupon the storm beats against it. Those who never thought it desirable, for there are intelligences to which most ideals seem dangerous and temperaments to which they are offensive, and who had previously treated it only with contempt in the abstract, offer the fiercest opposition to it as a practical proposal. Many of its supporters are paralyzed by difficult aspects which they had not previously considered, and the project recedes again into a region of shadows or abstract resolutions.

This, or something like this, has hitherto been the history of the ideal that has now become associated with the phrase "League of Nations," but it does not follow that the history of this or of other ideals will be the same after the war as before it. There is more at stake in this war than the existence of individual States or empires or the fate of the Continent. The whole of modern civilization is at stake, and whether it will perish, be submerged, as has happened to previous civilizations of older types, or whether it will live and progress depends upon whether the nations engaged in this war, and even those that are onlookers, learn the lessons that the experience of the war may teach them. It must be with nations as with individuals. In the great trials of life they must become better or worse, they cannot stand still. They must learn to profit by experience and rise to greater heights, or else sink lower and drop eventually into an abyss. And this war is the greatest trial of which there is any record in history. If the war does not teach mankind new lessons that will so dominate the thought and feeling of those who survive it and those who succeed the survivors as to make new things possible, then the war will be the greatest catastrophe as well as the most grievous trial and suffering of which mankind has any record.

Therefore, it does not follow that a league of nations to secure the peace of the world will remain impossible because it has not been possible hitherto, and I propose in this paper to consider shortly, to state rather than examine, for it would take a long time to examine thoroughly conditions that have not been present before,

and that are present now, or may soon be present, and that are essential if a league of nations is to become effective.

These conditions appear to me to be as follows:

First, the idea must be adopted with earnestness and conviction by the executive heads of States. It must become an essential part of their practical policy, one of their chief reasons for being, or continuing to be, responsible for the policy of their States. They must not adopt it only to render lip service to other persons whom it is inconvenient or ungracious to displease. They must lead and not follow. They must compel, if necessary, and not be compelled.

This condition was not present before the war. To what extent is it present now? It is not possible to answer this question fully, but it can be answered certainly and affirmatively as regards President Wilson, the executive head of the United States, and this alone is sufficient to give new life and purpose to the idea of a league of nations. President Wilson and his country have had in this matter the great advantage of having been for more than two years and a half, before April, 1917, able to observe the war as neutrals, free from the intense anxiety and effort that absorb all the thought and energy of the belligerents. They were able not only to observe but to reflect and to draw conclusions.

One of the conclusions has been that if the world, of which they form an important part, is to be saved from what they consider disaster, they must enter the war against Germany. Another has been that if national liberty and peace are to be secured in the future there must be a league of nations to secure them.

It must not be supposed from this that the Governments of the Allies are less ready to draw or have not already drawn the same conclusion from the experience of the war, but their countries have been at war all the time. They have been fighting, it is true, for the same ideal of national human liberty as the United States, but fighting also for the immediate preservation of national existence in Europe, and all their thought and energy has been concentrated upon resistance to imminent peril. Nevertheless, in this country, at any rate, the project of a league of nations has met with widespread, cordial acceptance.

On the other hand, the Military Party in Germany are, and must remain, opposed to it. They resent any limitation upon the use of force by Germany as fatal to German interests, for they can conceive no development and even no security except one based solely upon force. Any other conception is fatal, and this exclusive conception is essential to the maintenance of the power of the Military Party in Germany. As long, therefore, as this rule in Germany continues Germany will oppose the League of Nations. Nothing will change this except the conviction among the German people that the use of force causes at least as much suffering to themselves as to others, and that the security based upon law and treaty and the sense of mutual advantage is better than the risks, dangers, and sufferings of the will to supreme power and the efforts to obtain it, and this conviction must so work upon them as to displace the Military Party and their policy and ideals from power in Germany.

The situation, therefore, of this first condition essen-

tial to make the League of Nations practical may be summed up as follows:

It is present certainly as regards the executive head of the United States, which is potentially the strongest and actually the least exhausted of all belligerent States. It either is, or will at the end of the war be found to be, present as regards the Governments of the countries fighting on the same side as the United States. Even among their enemies Austria has publicly shown a disposition to accept the proposal and probably welcomes it genuinely, though secretly, as a safeguard for her future, not only against old enemies but against Prussian domination. All small States, belligerent or neutral, must naturally desire in their own interest everything that will safeguard the small States as well as the great from aggression and war.

There remains the opposition of Germany, where the recent military success and ascendancy of Prussian militarism have reduced the advocates of anything but force to silence. Germany has to be convinced that force does not pay, that the aims and policy of her military rulers inflict intolerable and also unnecessary suffering upon her, and that when the world is free from the menace of these military rulers, with their sharp swords, shining armor, and mailed fists, Germany will find peaceful development assured and preferable to expansion by war and will realize that the condition of true security for one nation is the sense of security on the part of all nations.

Till Germany feels this to be true there can be no League of Nations in the sense intended by President Wilson. A league such as he desires must include Germany, and should include no nation that is not thoroughly convinced of the advantages, of the necessity, of such a league, and is, therefore, not prepared to make the efforts, and if need be the sacrifices necessary to maintain it.

The second condition essential to the foundation of the League of Nations is that the Governments and peoples of the States willing to found it understand clearly that it will impose some limitations upon the national action of each, and may entail some inconvenient obligation. Smaller and weaker nations will have rights that must be respected and upheld by the league. Stronger nations must forego the right to make their interests prevail against the weaker by force, and all States must forego the right in any dispute to resort to force before other methods of settlement by conference, conciliation, or if need be arbitration, have been tried. This is the limitation. The obligation is that if any nation will not observe this limitation upon its national actions, if it breaks the agreement which is the basis of the league, rejects all peaceful methods of settlement and resorts to force against another nation, they must one and all use their combined force against it.

The economic pressure that such a league could use would in itself be very powerful, and the action of some of the smaller States composing the league could not perhaps go beyond the economic pressure, but those States that have the power must be ready to use all the force, economic, military, or naval, they possess. It must be clearly understood and accepted that deflection from or violation of the agreement by one or more

States does not absolve all or any of the others from the obligation to enforce the agreement.

Anything less than this is of no value. How worthless it may be can be seen by reading the debate in the House of Lords in 1867 upon the Treaty Guaranteeing the Neutrality of Luxemburg. It was there explained that we entered only into a collective guarantee. By this it was apparently meant that if any one of the guaranteeing powers violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, or even if any one of them declined to take active steps to defend it, Great Britain and the other guarantors were thereby absolved from taking any action whatever. This was contrasted at the time with the Belgian treaty, which entailed a separate guarantee. Hitherto the nations of the world had made reserves in arbitration or conciliation agreements, showing that they were not prepared to accept the limitations upon national action that are essential to secure an effective league of nations. An exception is the conciliation treaty between Great Britain and the United States negotiated before the war. But the statement made above is generally true. The nations also carefully abstained from undertaking any obligation to use force to uphold the benevolent rules of agreements of general application that had been recorded at The Hague Conferences. Such obligation had been confined to local objects like the neutrality of Belgium or to alliances between particular powers, made to protect or serve their special interests.

Are the nations of the world prepared now, or will they be ready after the war, to look steadily and clearly at this aspect of the League of Nations; at the limitations and obligations that it will impose, and to say whole-heartedly and convincingly, as they have never done before: "We will accept and undertake them?" Individuals in civilized States have long ago accepted analogous limitations and obligations as regards disputes between individuals. These are settled by law, and any individual who, instead of appealing to law, resorts to force to give effect to what he considers his rights, finds himself at once opposed and restrained by the force of the State—that is, in democratic countries, by the combined force of other individuals. And we not only accept this arrangement, but uphold it as essential to prevent the oppression of one by another, to secure each person in quiet life, and to guarantee to each the greatest liberty that is consistent with the equal liberty of his neighbors. That at any rate is part of the theory and object of democratic government, and if it is not perfectly attained, most of the proposals for improving it look rather to increased than to diminished State control.

But in less civilized parts of the world individuals have not reached the point of view from which this order of things seems desirable. There is the story of the native chief in Africa who protested to the British official against having to pay any taxes. The British official explained, no doubt in the best modern manner, that these taxes were used to keep order in the country, with the result that men and women and the flocks and herds in the possession of every tribe were safe, and each could live in its own territory without fear of disturbance, and that the payment of taxes was for the good of all. The effect of this explanation was to make the chief very angry. Before the British came he said

he could raid the neighborhood, return with captives and captures of all sorts, and be received in triumph by the women and the rest of the tribe when he returned. The protection of his own tribe from similar raids he was willing to undertake himself. "Now," he said, "you come here and tell me that I ought to like to pay taxes to be prevented from doing this, and that makes me mad."

The analogy between States and individuals, or groups of individuals, is not perfect, but there is sufficient analogy to make it not quite irrelevant to ask whether after this war the view held by the great States of the relations desirable between themselves will be that of the African chief or that of individuals in what we call civilized nations.

Nothing but experience convinced individuals that law was better than anarchy to settle relations between themselves. And the sanction that maintains law is the application of force with the support of the great majority of individuals behind it. Is it possible that the experience of this war will produce a settled opinion of the same sort to regulate the relations of States with one another and to safeguard the world from that which is in fact anarchy? What does the experience of this war amount to?

Our minds cannot grasp it. Thought is crushed by the accumulated suffering that the war has caused and is still causing. We cannot utter all we feel, and if it were not that our feelings are in a way stunned by the very violence of the catastrophe, as physical nerves are to some extent numbed by great blows, the human heart could not bear up and live under the trial of this war. Great must be the effect of all this; greater after, even, than during the war, on the working of men's minds and on human nature itself, but this is not what I intend to urge here.

I will urge only one point, and one that is for the head rather than the heart. We are now in the fourth year of the war. The application of scientific knowledge and the inventions of science during the war have made it more terrible and destructive each year. The Germans have abrogated all previously accepted rules of warfare. The use of poisonous gas, the firing from the sea upon open, undefended towns, and the indiscriminate bombing of big cities from the air were all introduced into the war by Germany.

It was long before the Allies adopted any of these practices even as reprisals, but the Germans have forced a ruthless, unlimited application of scientific discovery to the destruction of human life, combatant and non-combatant. They have shown the world that now and henceforth war means this, and nothing less than this.

If there is to be another war in twenty or thirty years' time, what will it be like? If there is to be concentrated preparation for more war, the researches of science will be devoted henceforth to discovering methods by which the human race can be destroyed. These discoveries cannot be confined to one nation, and their object of wholesale destruction will be much more completely achieved hereafter even than in this war. The Germans are not blind to this, but, as far as I can see, their rulers propose to avoid future wars by establishing domination by Germany forever.

Peace can never be secured by the domination of one

country, securing its power and prosperity by submission and disadvantage to others; and the German idea of a world peace secured by the power of German militarism is impracticable as well as unfair and abhorrent to other nations. It is as intolerable and impossible in the world as despotism would be here or in the United States.

In opposition to this idea of Germany, the Allies should set forth, as President Wilson has already set forth, an idea of peace secured by mutual regard between States for the rights of each, and the determination to stamp out any attempt at war as they would a plague that threatened the destruction of all. When those who accept this idea and this sort of peace can in word and deed speak for Germany we shall be within sight of a good peace.

The establishment and maintenance of a league of nations such as President Wilson had advocated is more important and essential to secure peace than any of the actual terms of peace that may conclude the war. It will transcend them all. The best of them will be worth little unless the future relations of States are to be on a basis that will prevent a recurrence of militarism in any State.

"Learn by experience or suffer" is the rule of life. We have all of us seen individuals becoming more and more a misery to themselves and others because they cannot understand or will not accept this rule. Is it not applicable to nations as well? And, if so, have not nations come to the great crisis in which for them the rule "Learn or perish" will prove inexorable? All must learn the lesson of this war. The United States and the Allies cannot save the world from militarism unless Germany learns her lesson thoroughly and completely, and they will not save the world or even themselves by a complete victory over Germany until they, too, have learned and can apply the lesson that militarism has become the deadly enemy of mankind.

A FRIENDLY TALK WITH MEXICO

By WOODROW WILSON

The President's Address to the Party of Mexican Journalists
Touring the United States as Guests of the Committee
on Public Information, at the White House, June 7, 1918.

GENTLEMEN, I have never received a group of men who were more welcome than you are, because it has been one of my distresses during the period of my Presidency that the Mexican people did not more thoroughly understand the attitude of the United States toward Mexico. I think I can assure you, and I hope you have had every evidence of the truth of my assurance, that that attitude is one of sincere friendship. And not merely the sort of friendship which prompts one not to do his neighbor any harm, but the sort of friendship which earnestly desires to do his neighbor service.

We Have Not Wished to Interfere

My own policy, the policy of my own administration, toward Mexico was at every point based upon this principle, that the internal settlement of the affairs of Mexico was none of our business; that we had no right

to interfere with or to dictate to Mexico in any particular with regard to her own affairs. Take one aspect of our relations which at one time may have been difficult for you to understand: When we sent troops into Mexico, our sincere desire was nothing else than to assist you to get rid of a man who was making the settlement of your affairs for the time being impossible. We had no desire to use our troops for any other purpose, and I was in hopes that by assisting in that way and then immediately withdrawing I might give substantial proof of the truth of the assurances that I had given your Government through President Carranza.

Even Now We Are Misrepresented

And at the present time it distresses me to learn that certain influences, which I assume to be German in their origin, are trying to make a wrong impression throughout Mexico as to the purposes of the United States, and not only a wrong impression, but to give an absolutely untrue account of things that happen. You know the distressing things that have been happening just off our coasts. You know of the vessels that have been sunk. I yesterday received a quotation from a paper in Guadalajara which stated that 13 of our battleships had been sunk off the capes of the Chesapeake. You see how dreadful it is to have people so radically misinformed. It was added that our Navy Department was withholding the truth with regard to these sinkings. I have no doubt that the publisher of the paper published that in perfect innocence without intending to convey wrong impressions, but it is evident that allegations of that sort proceed from those who wish to make trouble between Mexico and the United States.

Why Our Influence In the World Grows

Now, gentlemen, for the time being, at any rate—and I hope it will not be a short time—the influence of the United States is somewhat pervasive in the affairs of the world, and I believe that it is pervasive because the nations of the world which are less powerful than some of the greatest nations are coming to believe that our sincere desire is to do disinterested service. We are the champions of those nations which have not had a military standing which would enable them to compete with the strongest nations in the world, and I look forward with pride to the time, which I hope will soon come, when we can give substantial evidence, not only that we do not want anything out of this war, but that we would not accept anything out of it, that it is absolutely a case of disinterested action. And if you will watch the attitude of our people, you will see that nothing stirs them so deeply as assurances that this war, so far as we are concerned, is for idealistic objects. One of the difficulties that I experienced during the first three years of the war—the years when the United States was not in the war—was in getting the foreign offices of European nations to believe that the United States was seeking nothing for herself, that her neutrality was not selfish, and that if she came in, she would not come in to get anything substantial out of the war, any material object, any territory, or trade, or any-